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TO LINDA GREENHOUSE AND REVA B. SIEGEL’S 
BEFORE (AND AFTER) ROE V. WADE:  
NEW QUESTIONS ABOUT BACKLASH 
LOLITA BUCKNER INNISS

 
ABSTRACT 
This essay discusses the history of Roe v. Wade as recently addressed 
by Linda Greenhouse and Reva B. Siegel. Going beyond their assertions, I 
suggest that an additional, more encompassing inquiry focuses on what 
factors are implicated in the politics of abortion and how these factors 
relate to larger social, political, and cultural conflicts both before and 
after Roe. By naming party politics and the Catholic Church, Greenhouse 
and Siegel posit two crucial elements that shaped the abortion debate. I 
assert, however, that what is not discussed in their Article is the way 
numerous other factors have figured into the debate, race and class being 
two of the most salient. Race, class, and abortion have interacted in 
complex and numerous ways throughout United States history. While this 
interaction in some respects can be described via a linear, historical 
approach, it is not fully explicated by a single dichotomous before/after 
analysis centered on Roe. Instead, race, class, and abortion are constantly 
interacting, sometimes co-constructed, constituent parts of a much greater 
social, cultural, and political conversation in the United States. I suggest 
that if national party politics and the Catholic Church are important 
aspects of the development of the United States narrative on abortion, then 
race and class are telling and even compelling subtexts in that narrative. 
Giving attention to these subtextual strands may offer valuable additional 
insights. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
I agree with Linda Greenhouse and Reva B. Siegel’s assertion that 
identifying Roe v. Wade
1
 as the inchoative point of the abortion debate 
trajectory misapprehends the full scope and nature of the debate and 
unduly focuses on judicial actors.
2
 However, the before and after model 
that they embrace is perhaps not the most efficacious way of diagramming 
what has occurred in relation to abortion politics in the United States. The 
question is not only, I suggest, what happened before or after Roe. A more 
encompassing inquiry focuses on what factors are imbricated in the 
politics of abortion and how these factors relate to larger social, political, 
and cultural conflicts both before and after Roe. Two significant factors in 
the bigger picture are race and class. 
It is true that Roe has become generally synonymous with political 
conflict.
3
 It is also true that Roe is frequently cited as the source of 
political polarization over abortion and therefore functions as the “great 
divide” in addressing the social and political tenor of women’s 
reproductive rights in the United States.
4
 Thus, one of the most frequently 
occurring themes in discussing legal access to abortion is the dichotomy 
between conditions before abortion was made available throughout the 
United States via Roe and conditions after the ruling.
5
 Because before and 
after themes often signal the ameliorative or pejorative dimensions of a 
process or cause and effect, this type of thematic address primes the reader 
for a linear, temporal account of change. Greenhouse and Siegel adopt 
such a theme in their recent Article. In doing so, however, they seek to de-
center Roe, contending that partisan politics before Roe, and not 
disagreement with the Supreme Court’s decision after Roe, is significantly 
responsible for the contemporary backlash against abortion.
6
 They offer a 
political and historical account of what is frequently expressed in legal 
terms, explaining that the legal ruling in Roe was not the catalyst of the 
social and political storm surrounding abortion. Instead, Greenhouse and 
 
 
 1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 2. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About 
Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028 (2011).  
 3. Id. at 2030. 
 4. Id. 
 5. As one writer observes, seventeen states had legalized or decriminalized abortion before Roe 
v. Wade; the Court’s decision in Roe barred state statutes that universally banned abortion. LINDA 
GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA 
300 (2002). 
 6. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 2, at 2031. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/6
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Siegel aver, the decision in Roe is part of the broader conflict over 
abortion that existed before Roe was decided.
7
  
At the heart of Greenhouse and Siegel’s argument is the claim that in 
the years immediately before Roe, strategists for the Republican Party 
encouraged President Nixon to attack abortion and to articulate anti-
abortion positions.
8
 The purpose of the attack was in order to draw 
Catholic voters away from their traditional Democratic alliances. 
Republican embrace of anti-abortion stances was a method of attracting 
social conservatives, especially Catholics, who eschewed “radical” groups 
and policies supported by Democratic candidates.
9
 Greenhouse and Siegel, 
as they make clear in their Article, do not urge that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Roe played no role in the abortion conflict.
10
 Rather, they 
assert that pre-Roe abortion conflicts, and the resulting shifting alignments 
of political actors, are important keys to understanding the United States 
abortion debate.
11
 Hence, write Greenhouse and Siegel, these matters and 
related issues in the period before Roe are worthy of further scholarly 
examination.
12
 
By naming party politics and the Catholic Church, the authors posit 
two crucial elements that shaped the abortion debate. However, what is not 
discussed in their Article is the way that numerous other factors have 
figured into the debate, race and class being two of the most salient. Race, 
class, and abortion have interacted in complex and numerous ways 
throughout United States history. While this interaction in some respects 
can be described via a linear, historical approach, it is not fully explicated 
by a single dichotomous before/after analysis centered on Roe. Instead, 
race, class, and abortion are constantly interacting, sometimes co-
constructed, constituent parts of a much greater social, cultural, and 
political conversation in the United States.  
In the Article, the authors propound their arguments in three parts. In 
Part I of their Article, they consider four claims and frames that shape the 
way in which abortion was discussed before Roe: public health, concerns 
for the environment and population, sexual freedom, and finally feminist 
voices.
13
 In Part II, the authors describe how abortion politics became a 
part of a political strategy as Republicans, who had often been among the 
 
 
 7. Id. at 2030–31. 
 8. Id. at 2031, 2052–59. 
 9. Id. at 2052. 
 10. Id. at 2086. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. at 2034–45. 
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supporters of abortion liberalization before Roe, began to articulate anti-
abortion points of view.
14
 This shift, they explain, was largely in order to 
attract socially conservative and/or religious voters away from the 
Democratic Party.
15
 Finally, in Part III of the Article, the authors survey 
popular and academic commentary that position the Roe case as the legal 
and political polestar of the debate on abortion.
16
 I suggest that if national 
party politics and the Catholic Church are important aspects of the 
development of the United States narrative on abortion, then race and class 
are telling and even compelling subtexts in that narrative. Giving attention 
to these subtextual strands may offer valuable additional insights. 
II. THE DISCOURSE OF ABORTION 
In Part I of their Article, the authors point out that although most 
contemporary meanings of abortion center on Roe, the discursive import 
of abortion changed in structure, meaning, and intensity well prior to Roe. 
While this is in some senses a discussion of a sociohistoric rhetorical 
phenomenon, it is well more than a rhetorical concern. These multiple 
discursive frames—public health, environmental and population concerns, 
sexual freedom, and feminist voices—each entertaining a particular 
construction of abortion, are all part of a larger social and cultural program 
underwritten by issues of race and class.  
For instance, in discussiong the history of abortion Greenhouse and 
Siegel indicate that abortion was widely permitted in the United States 
prior to 1821 if performed before quickening.
17
 They identify an 1821 
Connecticut law as the first state statute criminalizing abortion.
18
 The 1821 
Connecticut statute is often said to mark the beginning of legal bars on 
abortion. Abortion was in fact permitted even under the 1821 Connecticut 
statute if performed before quickening and done by mechanical means; the 
statute was in many respects a codification of existing United States legal 
norms and criminalized only post-quickening abortion via “deadly poison, 
or any noxious or destructive substance” that was administered “to cause 
 
 
 14. Id. at 2046–70. 
 15. Id. at 2056. 
 16. Id. at 2071–85. 
 17. Id. at 2034. 
 18. Id. Though the 1821 Connecticut statute represents the first explicit state criminalization of 
post-quickening abortion, between 1821 and 1841 ten states passed laws that criminalized abortions, 
chiefly by making providers of abortifacients and mechanical abortion procedures subject to 
prosecution and criminal penalties. ANDREA TONE, CONTROLLING REPRODUCTION, AN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 138 (1996).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/6
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or procure a miscarriage.”19 Gradually, Greenhouse and Siegel indicate, 
other states enacted bans on abortion, leading to nation-wide prohibitions 
by the turn of the nineteenth-century.
20
  
There is, however, a back-story to this commonly offered legal history 
of abortion in the United States, and this back-story that raises issues of 
race and class. It has been suggested that the move by many states to 
legislatively bar abortion was associated with the beginning of the “penny 
press” era in which the availability of abortion was promulgated via 
advertisements in mass media publications popular among the poor.
21
 
Prior to this period, states had not necessarily perceived abortion as a 
significant problem, and thus states often practiced a policy of abortion 
“containment” in lieu of active enforcement efforts.22 Moreover, in 
looking at the historic overview that Greenhouse and Siegel offer, it is 
noteworthy that the move towards criminalizing abortion, beginning in the 
1820s, heightening after the Civil War, and culminating at the end of the 
nineteenth-century with widespread bans on abortion, also coincided with 
significant conflicts over slavery, leading up to the Civil War and black 
freedom. This time period also heralded a large-scale growth in the 
number of poor people in the United States, with much of this expansion 
attributable to immigration and the general emancipation of blacks. The 
coincidence of heightened abortion bars and the increase in numbers of 
free blacks and poor people is not to suggest that concerns about blacks or 
poor people were necessarily at the center of, either ideologically or 
materially, the nineteenth-century abortion debate. Nonetheless, it is 
interesting to note that the antebellum conflict over black slavery and the 
impact of Dred Scott v. Sandford, differently contextualized, is becoming 
 
 
 19. See JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL 
POLICY, 1800–1900 21 (1978). It may be useful to examine more closely the history of the 
Connecticut statute and other state statutes in much the same way that Greenhouse and Siegel consider 
the pre-history of Roe. According to one writer, the Connecticut statute was adopted in almost direct 
response to a scandalous case that took place in Connecticut in 1818 involving a minister who was 
convicted of impregnating a young woman to whom he was not married and then giving her an 
abortion-inducing substance. MARVIN N. OLASKY, ABORTION RITES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
ABORTION IN AMERICA 92–93 (1992); see also KAREN ERDEVIG GEDGE, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF 
CLERGY: WOMEN AND THE PASTORAL RELATIONSHIP IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN CULTURE 
57 (2003). For an account of the case by the convicted minister, see AMMI ROGERS, MEMOIRS OF THE 
REV. AMMI ROGERS, A.M. (1834). Rogers asserts in his memoirs that the accuser later recanted. 
Rogers also argued that the case was part of a political and religious plot to discredit him. Id. at 5–6. 
For a brief mention of Ammi Rogers and his memoirs, see William Renwick Riddell, Common Law 
and Common Sense, 27 YALE L.J. 993, 998 (1918). 
 20. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 2, at 2034. 
 21. OLASKY, supra note 19, at 94. 
 22. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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a metaphor of choice for some contemporary anti-abortion activists.
23
 
However, the occurrence of large-scale racial and class upheaval and 
associated concerns about the “moral decay” of society, contemporaneous 
with a sharp rise in anti-abortion sentiment, bears some investigation.  
Race and class are infused throughout other discursive frames that the 
authors identify as well. For instance, the authors assert that the 
professional medical establishment, embodied by the American Medical 
Association, was in significant part responsible for the criminalization of 
abortion.
24
 Preventing abortion was framed as a public health concern 
during the move to professionalize medicine, as formally trained 
physicians sought to establish standards for membership in and conduct of 
the medical profession.
25
 Here race and class are more clearly implicated, 
because in much of the early history of the United States women’s 
reproductive health care was a domestic art performed by midwives, and 
among the masses such care was frequently performed by poor, often 
immigrant women, slaves, and later free black women. These women 
practiced "healing arts" and folk cures.
26
 Black “grannies” or midwives 
came under particular scrutiny by professional physicians.
27
 Black 
midwives were often suspected of either performing abortions or 
imparting to pregnant women information on how to perform them.
28
 
Throughout the Americas, black women were sometimes accused of 
providing “specifics,” “herbs,” or “powders” to women seeking to end a 
pregnancy.
29
 Poor immigrant women were among the largest group of 
 
 
 23. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (an infamous and ultimately discredited case 
supporting black slavery and articulating the non-citizenship of blacks whether slave or free) and Roe 
are increasingly used by some contemporary anti-abortion politicians as part of a strategy to 
delegitimize Roe by offering a new tool with which to attack its moral underpinnings. Thus 
implemented, the two cases are sometimes shaped so as to appear “as a single line of villainy to be 
overcome by Americans.” CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC: 
COMMUNICATING SOCIAL CHANGE 50 (1994). These politicians seek to establish a history in which 
Dred Scott and Roe are “thematically linked and historically plotted.” Id. 
 24. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 2, at 2035. 
 25. Id. 
 26. KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 16 (1985). 
 27. See, e.g., Stacey A. Tovino, American Midwifery Litigation and State Legislative Preferences 
For Physician-Controlled Childbirth, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 61, 75 (2004). 
 28. GERTRUDE JACINTA FRASER, AFRICAN AMERICAN MIDWIFERY IN THE SOUTH: DIALOGUES 
OF BIRTH, RACE, AND MEMORY 90 (1998). 
 29. DAVID BARRY GASPAR, MORE THAN CHATTEL: BLACK WOMEN AND SLAVERY IN THE 
AMERICAS 205 (1996). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/6
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abortion providers in some places.
30
 Immigrant women were most likely to 
patronize immigrant midwives when seeking abortions.
31
  
Greenhouse and Siegel further point out in Part I of their Article that 
twentieth-century advocates for liberalizing access to abortion also cited 
health concerns, and that by the 1960s, Americans were debating abortion 
as a problem concerning “poverty, population control, sexual freedom, and 
women’s equal citizenship.”32 The authors term these “new ways” of 
talking about abortion, apparently in contrast to medical discourses that 
had previously dominated conversations on the issue.
33
 I would suggest 
that such ways of talking about abortion in the 1960s were not new at all, 
especially the first two. Poverty and population control had been at the 
heart of programs created decades earlier by women’s rights activists and 
reformers such as Margaret Sanger. Sanger was a pivotal figure who 
sought to increase women’s control over reproduction both as a means of 
enhancing their freedom and as a method of population control.
34
 Much of 
her work was controversial, not only because Sanger promoted women’s 
access to birth control, but because of racial and class concerns raised by 
her work.
35
 Both in Sanger’s time and in more contemporary accounts of 
her work, some accused Sanger of advocating a program of eugenics to 
reduce the number of poor people, immigrants, and blacks.
36
 
 
 
 30. See, e.g., LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND 
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1867–1973, at 71–73 (1998). Investigators of midwives in Chicago, New 
York, Boston and Baltimore suspected that five percent to over fifty percent of midwives performed 
illegal abortions. Id. at 71.  
 31. Id. at 73 
 32. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 2, at 2034–35. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Loretta J. Ross, African-American Women and Abortion, in ABORTION WARS: A HALF 
CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950–2000, at 161–62 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998). 
 35. Sanger was not directly associated with abortion advocacy and is said to have publicly 
opposed it, though her private views were less clear. See TIANA NORGREN & CHRISTIANA A. E. 
NORGREN, ABORTION BEFORE BIRTH CONTROL: THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION IN POSTWAR JAPAN 
54 (2001). It is worth noting here that birth control and abortion were often considered parts of the 
same conversation. Sanger herself acknowledged the relation between abortion and contraception in 
suggesting that abortion, while undesireable in most circumstances, was an extreme form of birth 
control, and should not be considered a “crime”. MARGARET SANGER, WOMEN AND THE NEW RACE 
63 (1923). Abortion, Sanger wrote, presented serious risks to women’s health, especially to the health 
of poorer women without access to skilled medical care or time for recovery after an abortion. Id. at 
65. These risks could be avoided if women had access to contraception. Id. at 66–67. 
 36. Ross, supra note 34, at 171. According to Ross, Sanger came under the influence of nativist 
whites who were at the center of the eugenics movement. As a result, Sanger changed her approach 
from one that promoted the interests of all women to one that framed birth control as the privilege of 
well-to-do women but the moral obligation of black and immigrant women. Id. While Sanger’s 
references to the “new race” in her work has sometimes been understood as evidence of her support for 
the eugenics movement, others have argued that Sanger was referring to the improvement of the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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III. THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND REPUBLICAN  
PARTY POLITICS 
In Part II of their Article, the authors detail how, in order to woo 
Catholic voters who were opposed to abortion, Republicans began to 
oppose abortion despite the fact that they had been among the earliest 
adherents of decriminalizing abortion.
 
In doing so, the authors enter into 
and help to enlarge an already established scholarly conversation on this 
point. They note that the overarching goal of the Catholic Church was to 
reverse the trend of liberalizing abortion laws. While part of the Catholic 
strategy for opposing abortion was to frame opposition in more secular 
terms, ultimately, anti-abortion activism remained closely tied to and even 
became a central part of Catholic identity. Seizing on the Catholic 
opposition to abortion, the Republican Party began to adopt anti-abortion 
positions in order to attract Catholic voters. Greenhouse and Siegel cite the 
work of Kevin Phillips, a Republican strategist who predicted the fall of 
New Deal politics and who helped to widen the Republican coalition to 
include Catholics who opposed abortion and Southerners who opposed 
civil rights.
37
 This latter point, I think, deserves additional discussion, as 
here again the politics of race and class and the politics of abortion 
converge and merge. 
Kevin Phillips’s work on the Republican “Southern strategy” is well 
known.
38
 Much of this strategy focused on drawing mostly poor and 
working class white Southerners who resented black civil rights gains.
39
 
The Southern strategy and its race-based focus were not limited to the 
South, however.
40
 Much like Southerners, working-class Catholics in the 
 
 
human species in general and not to a plan of racial debasement or extirpation. MARGARET SANGER, 
WOMEN AND THE NEW RACE vii (1923). 
 37. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 2, at 2052. 
 38. KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY (1969). Here Phillips offers a 
historical overview of United States electorcal history and urgers Republicans to forego Northern 
voters in favor of Southerners. See George Packer, The New Liberalism, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 543, 546–47 
(2009). Packer describes the “Southern strategy” as a means of dividing white Democrats in the South 
from the rest of the party. Id. at 546. This included strategies such as nominating white Southerners for 
the United States Supreme Court, thereby polarizing Democrats. Id. See also Michael Tonry, The 
Social, Psychological, and Political Causes of Racial Disparities in the American Criminal Justice 
System, 39 CRIME AND JUST. 273, 278–79 (2010). Tonry wrote “[t]he Republican Southern Strategy 
was premised on an extraordinary non sequitur—that black/white differences in the South in the 1960s 
were indistinguishable from ethnic differences at other times and places in American history.” Id. at 
278. Relying upon these differences, asserted Tonry, Kevin Phillips concluded that “manipulation of 
racial passions would enable Republicans to achieve political dominance in the South and strengthen 
their appeal to working-class whites elsewhere.” Id. at 279.  
 39. PHILLIPS, supra note 38, at 23–26. 
 40. Packer suggests that calling such methods the Southern strategy was too narrow, as these 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/6
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North also resented what they perceived as black intrusion into their 
neighborhoods, their schools, and their workplaces.
41
 The Catholic 
position on abortion was an issue that, while abundantly fueling the social 
and political storm of the 1960s and 70s, must be read with the larger 
concerns of race and class among Catholics in the South and in the urban 
North.
42
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Part III of their Article, Greenhouse and Siegel illustrate the points 
that they make earlier in their Article about the neglect of pre-Roe, non-
juristic explanations of the abortion conflict. They detail the varying 
accounts frequently offered as to why the Court’s decision in Roe had such 
powerful effects on the nation’s politics: Roe’s nationalization of the 
abortion conflict, Roe’s divergence from popular opinion, and Roe’s 
prevention of compromise.
43
 At the foundation of all these accounts, the 
authors assert, is the notion that bad judicial decision-making caused bad 
politics.
44
 The authors cite a number of legal, scholarly, and media 
accounts that seem to adopt this premise. They go on to suggest that the 
Court-centric narrative concerning judicial decision-making is not 
sufficiently fact-based and thus does not adequately explain the politics of 
abortion. The authors opine that the history of the abortion conflict before 
Roe points up the need for a “deep history” assessment of abortion post-
Roe.
45
 This assessment would ostensibly entail a reading of the abortion 
 
 
techiques were used “countrywide” and involved “Catholics in the North and ethnics in the city” as 
well. George Packer, The New Liberalism, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 543, 547 (2009). 
 41. HARRY S. ASHMORE, CIVIL RIGHTS AND WRONGS: A MEMOIR OF RACE AND POLITICS, 
1944–1996, at 245 (1997). 
 42. See, e.g., JOHN T. MCGREEVY, PARISH BOUNDARIES: THE CATHOLIC ENCOUNTER WITH 
RACE IN THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBAN NORTH 194–95 (1998).  
 43. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 2, at 2073–74. 
 44. Id. at 2074. 
 45. Id. at 2076. “Deep history” generally refers to a domain of inquiry that extends into human 
prehistory, thousands or even millions of years into the past. Deep history is in contrast to standard 
scholarly methodological approaches to history that address human history from relatively recent times 
beginning in the 1700s. Andrew Shyrock & Daniel Lord Small, Introduction, in DEEP HISTORY: THE 
ARCHITECTURE OF PAST AND PRESENT, at 11–12 (Andrew Shyrock and Daniel Lord Small eds., 2011). 
The term deep history has, however, been adopted across disciplines by scholars in various fields who 
“fret about chronological constraints and issue calls for ‘evolutionary politcs,’ ‘evolutionary 
economics,’ or evolutionary studies of the law.” Id. at 12. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, Western Legal 
Imperialism: Thinking about the Deep Historical Roots, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 305, 
309–20 (2009) (arguing that the rise of Western law and its institutional tendency to spread is not a 
contemporary phenomenon but instead began in antiquity). In calling for a deep history Greenhouse 
and Siegel employ the phrase only in its most general sense of seeking answers beyond the immediate 
reach of the legal history of abortion. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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controversy that recognizes that the Court is not necessarily or at all the 
source of the controversy.  
I am well in accord with the authors on the need to engage in a more 
archaeological assessment of Roe. To date much scholarly attention has 
been focused on the legal configuration of Roe and on assumptions about 
its normative role in creating and shaping the politics of abortion. 
Greenhouse and Siegel sound a clarion call to scholars for a more integral 
analysis of the social, cultural, and political history of the abortion debate. 
I would add, however, that it is crucial to recognize the United States 
abortion debate as a consequential discursive skein in the “politics of 
emotion,” a politics that, in some instances, has replaced overt racist or 
classist appeals with moral and religious judgmentalism via abortion.
46
 
Hence, a fuller history of the abortion debate must encompass by necessity 
other factors, especially race and class, in order to offer a complete 
picture.  
 
 
 46. GLENN FELDMAN, POLITICS AND RELIGION IN THE WHITE SOUTH 5 (2005). Feldman 
discusses the way in which anti-black racism was in some instances replaced by anti-abortion rhetoric 
as a shibboleth of social and political conservatism. Feldman writes, for instance, that in one religious 
denomination, the “sin” of endorsing abortion rights replaced endorsing integration, but that factions 
within the group who contended over these issues were comprised essentially of the same people. Id. 
at 101. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/6
